leading American players of the early and mid-2000s, including Freddy Adu, Tim Howard, and DeMarcus Beasley, left MLS to pursue what were perceived to be better financial and developmental opportunities in Europe, joining other American players already plying their trade across the Continent.
The flight of young talent from MLS mirrored the situation of the domestically successful Dutch and Belgian clubs who have failed to market themselves in the international market, missed out on star players, and therefore have been unable to raise their leagues to the level of international prestige that the top leagues enjoy. Ajax Amsterdam may be the most recognizable club in the Dutch league, but due to a lack of star power on its roster, investors have not been interested in a venture that would create revenue and advance the team globally. As a result, Ajax remains competitively and financially inferior to the elite clubs of England, Germany, Spain, and Italy. In its first decade of operation, MLS was faced with a similar scenario in which it needed to procure some of the world's best players while they were still in their prime-not veterans nearing retirement-in order to capitalize on the publicity and the interested investors that were likely to follow. Further, the key for the league was to devise a strategy to do this while retaining the best domestic talent.
Establishing a Plan for Stability and Growth
Throughout its first decade, MLS faced a number of obstacles on American soil. These included acquiring the services of passionate and motivated investors, reaching out to a more ethnically diverse market, and emphasizing that soccer has the largest following of any sport in the world. 3 Taking into account the unique intricacies of MLS and its need to avoid the errors of the defunct North American Soccer League (NASL), the league adopted a more globalized approach to its professional soccer structure by establishing the Project-40 player development program. MLS hoped this program would develop a deeper pool of players with which it could draw talent from to help increase the level of play and improve the league's image and appeal for investors both nationally and internationally. 4 With respect to its marketing strategy, MLS focused on four primary interests: the construction of soccer-specific stadiums, catering to the Hispanic population, encouraging the youth of America to become spectators of the sport as well as participants, and the recruitment of new investors to the League. Secondary considerations related to increasing sponsorship, the establishment of team rivalries, league expansion, the inclusion of a healthy mix of domestic and foreign players, changing and/or developing team identities to resonate with fans, participation in national and international tournaments, and the hosting of international exhibitions.
It is apparent that MLS also explored adopting or modifying several of the techniques that bolstered the reputations of professional leagues overseas and highlighted the global charm of some of their clubs. Primarily, the placement strategies and marketing models used by the thriving English, German, Spanish, and Italian soccer leagues differed from those being used in the U.S and had a track record of success. Specifically, these leagues and their leading clubs efficiently and successfully tapped into foreign markets (including Asia and the sizable U.S. market), established strategic alliances with global media outlets (i.e., media mogul Rupert Murdoch) to generate revenue and enter the global arena, and sold clubs as popular international brands with appealing identities. Also, the creation and development
